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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

;

Plaintiff/Appellee,

: Case No. 900560-CA

v.

: Priority No, 2

FOSTER M. LEONARD,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of
equipment with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8
(Supp. 1991), and for conspiracy to manufacture a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-4-201 (1990) and 58-37-8 (Supp. 1991).

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(f) (Supp. 1991).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence on the
grounds that the investigatory stop of defendants' vehicle was
supported by reasonable suspicion, that the subsequent search of
defendants' vehicle was proper, that officers provided
appropriate Miranda warnings prior to questioning defendants and
that the affidavit in support of a search warrant for defendants'
residence was sufficient to establish probable cause.

Because

the trial court is in the best position to assess witness
credibility in a motion to suppress hearing, this Court "will not
disturb its factual assessment underlying a decision to . . .
deny a suppression motion unless it clearly appears that the
lower court was in error."
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 285

A trial court's findings are not clearly

erroneous unless they are either against the clear weight of the
evidence, or this Court reaches a "definite and firm conviction"
that the trial court was mistaken.

State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537,

539 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted); State v. Ashe, 745
P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).

However, this Court reviews

conclusions drawn from the trial court's fact findings as a
matter of law, giving no deference to the lower court's ruling.
State v. Caver, No. 900297-CA, slip op. at 7 (Utah Ct. App. June
25, 1991).
When a search warrant is challenged as having been
issued without an adequate showing of probable cause, the
reviewing court does not conduct a de novo review of the
magistrate's probable cause determination; instead, the reviewing
court determines only whether the magistrate had a substantial
basis for concluding that probable cause existed.
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989).

State v.

The reviewing court

should pay "great deference" to the magistrate's decision.

-2-

Ibid.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Foster M. Leonard, was charged with two
counts of possession of a controlled substance, to wit, ephedrine
and hydriodic acid, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37c-4(b) (Supp. 1991); possession of equipment
with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8 (Supp. 1991);
conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance, to wit,
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 58-37-8 (Supp. 1991) and 76-4-201 (1990) and giving false
information to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (Supp. 1991) (Record
[hereinafter R.] at 12-13).
Following the trial court's denial of his motions to
suppress evidence, defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty
to the charges of possession of equipment with intent to
manufacture a controlled substance and conspiracy to manufacture
a controlled substance, as third degree felonies, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8 (Supp. 1991) and Utah Code Ann. §§ 5837-8 (Supp. 1991) and 76-4-201 (1990) (R. at 44, 51, 65, 113-21
(motions to suppress), 151-58 (statement of defendant), 108-12
(trial court's ruling)).

-3-

Defendant was subsequently sentenced to not more than
five years on each count and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine on each
count, sentences to run concurrently (R. at 189-87 )•
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
For purposes of the issues raised on appeal, the
pertinent facts are those set out in the trial court's ruling (R.
at 108-112) .l

The Court's findings of fact and conclusions of

law are as follows:
[1] From approximately May 1, 1989, law
enforcement agencies had been conducting
surveillance at Intertech Chemical in Orem[,]
Utah. The surveillance has resulted in a
number of arrests and convictions. On July
20, 1989, Detective Terry Fox was conducting
surveillance at Intertech. He noticed
defendant Leonard in the parking lot wearing
casual clothes and using what appeared to be
a personal vehicle rather than a company
vehicle. Leonard behaved in a nervous
manner. He purchased what looked to the
detective to be glassware and chemicals and
appeared to pay in cash. Defendants loaded
the glassware and chemicals in to the vehicle
and left the parking lot.
[2] Detective Fox decided to follow the
vehicle in order to identify its owner. As
Fox attempted to follow the vehicle, another
car swerved in front of Fox in an apparent
attempt to disrupt his progress. It appeared
to Fox that the defendants' vehicle was
trying to evade pursuit. Fox noted reckless
behavior on the part of the defendants as
they turned to get on the freeway that nearly
caused an accident. On the freeway, the
defendants' accelerated to over 70 miles per
hour in a 55 miles per hour zone.

1

Defendant does not appear to dispute the trial court's
findings; rather, defendant challenges the credibility of the
officers who testified at the motion to suppress hearing (Br. of
App. at 5-6).
-4-

[3] Detective Fox called for back up after a
check through dispatch found no owner
registered for either the plates of the
defendants' vehicle nor for the vehicle that
swerved in front of him* The vehicle was
stopped without incident after the backup
arrived.2 The officers on the scene then
arrested the defendants and gave the
appropriate Miranda warnings. Defendants
were interviewed separately concerning what
they had purchased and the purpose for which
they had purchased it. They gave the
officers different stories—but both
indicated that they were purchasing the
equipment for someone else. Defendant
Leonard at first gave a false identification
and date of birth. Over $2,000 was found in
defendant Garza's purse.
[4] Prior to the arrest of the defendants
and the search of the vehicle, the officers
had made contact with Intertech and were told
what the defendants had purchased.3 The
items found in the vehicle—including
glassware and chemicals—matched the
description of the merchandise given by
Intertech. The vehicle contained items
frequently used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine. Defendant Garza gave two
different addresses as her own. After
checking with Mountain Bell, the officers
found that one of the addresses given had a
phone listed in her name. Based upon the
information given above, a search warrant was
2

Based on information provided him by Officer Fox, Officer
Gary Caldwell of the American Fork Police Department effected the
stop of the defendants' vehicle (T. at 82-90). The stop was
based on the officers' belief that defendants were in possession
of drug paraphernalia, as well as controlled substances (T. at
53, 56-58, 61, 89-90).
3

Although the trial court correctly found that Intertech
was contacted prior to defendant's arrest, a review of Officer
Caldwell's testimony at the suppression hearing makes clear that
the arresting officers received the Intertech information even
prior to the stop of defendants' vehicle (T. at 33). In
addition, Officer Caldwell learned that defendants paid cash and
did not provide Intertech with their names at the time of
purchase (R. at 7, para. #8; a copy of Officer's Caldwell's
affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum A ) .
-5-

served on defendant Garza's residence.
Numerous "listed" chemicals and drug
paraphernalia were found.
[5] The Court finds that the stop made by
the officers was appropriate and legal.
Detective Fox had reasonable suspicion based
on the circumstances taken as a whole. The
defendants did not appear to be ordinary
businessmen; they appeared to be nervous;
they drove erratically, they used what
appeared to be a personal vehicle; another
car seemed to be acting in concert with
defendants in an attempt to block the
detective's pursuit; dispatch could not
identify owner of the vehicle from the
license plate number; the defendants were
traveling more than 15 miles per hour in
excess of the speed limit; the list of items
purchased given to the officers while in
pursuit were indicative of illegal activity.
All of these factors taken together could
easily create a reasonable and articulateble
[sic] suspicion necessary to make an
investigatory stop.
[6] Defendants were properly given their
Miranda warnings. Even before the officers
began investigatory questioning which does
not require it, defendants were given Miranda
warnings. Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d
1168, 1170 (1983).
[7] The Court believes the search of the
defendant's vehicle was proper. The list of
items purchased from Intertech received while
the officers were in pursuit, combined with
the suspicious behavior of the defendants,
and all attendant circumstances, created
probable cause for [the] search of the
vehicle. Even if the search was improper,
the illegality would not affect the legality
of the search warrant. The reasoning of the
Court is that information relative to the
evidence found in the vehicle was available
to the officers in the form of a purchase
order from Intertech.
[8] The chemicals and equipment found in the
defendants' vehicle and on the purchase order
from Intertech were commonly used together in
the making of methamphe-camine. In fact
-6-

testimony indicated that the materials found
lacked only one specialized piece of
glassware and some other chemicals to allow
one to easily make methamphetamine. Also,
such equipment is rarely used in conjunction
to make anything other than methamphetamine.
The officers, being aware of the facts above,
had probable cause to make the arrest.
[9] The Court believes that there was
sufficient probable cause for the issuance of
the search warrant based on the conduct of
the defendants and the purchase order from
Intertech. This probable cause was enhanced
by the statements of the defendants relative
to the intended use of the supplies obtained
from Intertech and the false information
given relative to living quarters and
identity.
[10] For the reasons given above, the Court
finds that the stop of the defendants'
vehicle, the subsequent questioning of the
defendants, and the issuance of the search
warrant were proper. Therefore, the Court
denies defendantsf'] motion to suppress.
(R. at 108-12).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's arguments in points I-III of his brief
appear to focus on the trial court's assessment of reasonable
suspicion for the initial stop of defendant's Bronco (Br. of App.
at

10-13).

Specifically, defendant broadly asserts that the

stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and therefore the
subsequent arrest, seizure of contraband, investigatory
questioning and warrant-based search of his residence were all
impermissibly tainted (Br. of App. at 10-13).

Defendant's

unsubstantiated and erroneous allegations lack merit as well as
record support.

-7-

The stop of defendant's vehicle was supported by a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

Prior to

the stop, investigating officers had observed defendant's and his
companion's suspicious conduct, including the cash purchase of
glassware and chemicals commonly used in the illegal manufacture
of methamphetamine, as well as defendants' evasive and reckless
driving.

Notwithstanding the above, defendant challenges the

subsequent search of the Bronco and police questioning solely on
the alleged illegality of the initial stop.

However, because the

initial stop of defendant's vehicle was valid as based on
reasonable suspicion, defendant's arguments are all equally
without merit.
As for defendant's allegations concerning the
sufficiency of Officer Caldwell's affidavit, a review of the
record supports the magistrate's finding of probable cause for
the issuance of the search warrant.

Contrary to defendant's

assertion, the affidavit clearly identified the "source" of
Officer Caldwell's information which included his and other
officers' observations of defendant in possession of drug
paraphernalia.

Moreover, because a police officer is generally

presumed to be reliable, no special showing of the officers'
reliability is required.

-8-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED BY POLICE
WAS PROPER.
In point I of his brief on appeal, defendant challenges
the trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion in
support of the investigatory stop of defendant's vehicle (Br. of
App. at 5).

Specifically, defendant asserts that the trial court

erred in relying on the testimony of the officers in assessing
the facts in support of its determination of reasonable suspicion
for the stop (Br. of App. at 6-7, 10). Defendant further alleges
that certain of the trial court's findings were erroneous, and
that viewing the facts individually, they fail to support the
trial court's ruling (Br. of App. at 6-9). Defendant's
unsubstantiated and erroneous allegations are without merit.
Due to the trial court's "advantageous position in
determining the factual basis for a motion to suppress," as well
as to "observe witnesses' demeanor and other factors bearing on
credibility," this Court will not upset a trial court's
underlying factual findings unless they appear to be clearly
erroneous.

State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah Ct. App.

1990) (citations omitted); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258
(Utah 1987).

A trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous

unless they are either against the clear weight of the evidence,
or this Court reaches a "definite and firm conviction" that the
trial court was mistaken.

Id., (citations omitted).
-9-

Accordingly,

this Court may not disturb the trial court's determination that
reasonable suspicion existed unless that factual finding is
clearly erroneous.

State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181/ 183 (Utah

1987); (Utah 1987); State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 137 n.l (Utah
Ct. App. 1991); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).

But see State v. Carter, No. 900303-CA, slip op. at

n.6 (Utah Ct. App. May 28, 1991) (amended opinion) (noting the
Court's confusion on the proper standard of review - i.e.,
whether to treat the trial court's determination of the existence
of reasonable suspicion as a question of fact or a conclusion of
law).4
The "reasonable suspicion" test was first articulated
by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).

There the Court held that when "a police officer

observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity is afoot," he
may make an investigative stop to confirm or dispel his

A

The State acknowledges that Utah is in the minority with
Mendoza's requirement that the reasonable suspicion determination
be reviewed as a finding of fact under a clearly erroneous
standard. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez - Alvarado, 891
F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989) (setting forth the generally held
view that whether reasonable suspicion exists is a mixed question
of fact and law, and the trial court's ultimate conclusion
regarding reasonable suspicion is a legal conclusion which is
reviewed do novo). In Carter the State plans to seek certiorari
review by the Utah Supreme Court and to ask that court for
clarification of the standard of review for reasonable suspicion
determinations. However, unless and until the Utah Supreme Court
disavows Mendoza, that decision and its clearly erroneous
standard of review are binding on this Court.
-10-

suspicion. Jd. at 30.5 A police officer who makes an
investigative stop must be able to point to "specific and
articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."

.Id. at 21.

The Terry "reasonable suspicion" test has been codified in Utah
Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990) which reads as follows:
Any peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has reasonable suspicion
to believe he has committed or is in the act
of committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand his name,
address, and an explanation of his actions.
This Court has interpreted the reasonable suspicion
test and concluded that a "brief investigatory stop must be based
on 'objective facts' that the 'individual is involved in criminal
activity.'"

State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah Ct. App.

1989) (citations omitted); Menke, 787 P.2d at 541.

5

This Court has previously noted that there are three
constitutionally permissible levels of police encounters:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that
the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the "detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if
the officer has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed or is being
committed.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd
on other grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991).
-11-

The undisputed testimony of the officers at the motion
to suppress hearing established that members of the North End
Narcotics Strike Team were conducting an ongoing investigation
into the establishment and operation of methamphetamine
laboratories (T. at 9-13, 27, 46, 64-65).

As; part of that

investigation, Officer Fox was conducting a visual surveillance
of Intertech Trading in Orem, Utah on July 20, 1989 when he
observed defendant and codefendant, April Garza, purchase
glassware and chemicals (T. at 10-12, 32). Officer Fox believed
defendant's behavior was suspiciously inconsistent with the
actions of a legitimate businessman for several reasons,
including defendant's casual dress and the absence of a company
logo on the Bronco, as well as defendant's continuous scanning of
the parking lot before lifting up the front of his shirt and
reaching down his pants to remove something (T. at 10-12, 27-29).
While Officer Fox watched, boxes depicting glass flasks (which
appeared to be the same size and shape as glassware boxes Officer
Fox had observed during previous investigations), as well as
gallon containers of some type of chemical, were loaded into the
back of the Bronco (T. at 11-13).
As the Bronco, driven by defendant, pulled out of the
Intertech parking lot, Officer Fox attempted to get the license
plate number of the vehicle (T. at 13). As he attempted to
follow defendant's Bronco, Officer Fox was intercepted by a cream
colored Datsun parked against traffic on the wrong side of the
road (T. at 13). After forcing Officer Fox to brake in order to
-12-

avoid hitting it, the Datsun fell in behind the Bronco, in front
of Officer Fox's vehicle (T. at 14). Upon reaching the 1-15
northbound on-ramp, Officer Fox observed the Bronco fail to yield
the right of way to another vehicle, forcing the other vehicle
off the road into the barrow pit (T. at 14). At the same time,
the Datsun slammed on its brakes and began weaving an S-pattern
in front of Officer Fox's vehicle (T. at 14). As he continued
following the Bronco northbound on 1-15, Officer Fox observed
several additional evasive tactics by defendant including
speeding and illegal lane changes (T. at 15-17).

He also

observed defendant apparently attempt to signal the Datsun by
putting bandanna-type flags out both windows of the Bronco (T. at
16).

A subsequent registration check on both the Bronco and

Datsun prior to the stop revealed that neither set of plates were
"on file" (T. at 15).
Officer Caldwell, who had been called for back-up
assistance, then contacted Intertech in an effort to determine
what defendant and his companion had purchased (T. at 33, 96).
Intertech informed Officer Caldwell what they had purchased, that
they paid cash and that they had not given their names at the
time of purchase (R. at 7, para. #8; see Addendum A ) .

Based on

information received from Intertech, as well as the personal
observations of Officer Fox and defendant's reckless, evasive
driving, Officer Caldwell stopped defendant's vehicle (T. at 3538, 53, 61, 66). As he approached to talk to defendant, Officer
Caldwell observed heating panels, heating units, glassware,
-13-

stirring rods, boxes of rubber gloves and color blast testing
strips in plain view in the Bronco (T. at 69),

Due to his

experience in the investigation of controlled substances and
their manufacture, Officer Caldwell was able to identify these
objects as the type commonly used in the unlawful manufacture of
methamphetamine (T. at 69-71).
Based on the foregoing, the stop of defendant's Bronco
was supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

As

has been recognized by this Court, trained police officers "may
be able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which
would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer. . . . "
Menke, 787 P.2d at 541. Thus, an officer is "entitled to assess
the facts in light of his experience."

.Id. (citations omitted).

Moreover, contrary to defendant's apparent assertion, an
officer's assessment of reasonable suspicion depends not on
isolated facts, but upon the totality of the circumstances.
State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Because the investigating officers in this case were able to
articulate their suspicions and identify the facts upon which
they were based, and because those suspicions were justified by
the totality of the circumstances confronting the officers, this
Court should affirm that the stop of defendant's vehicle was
lawful*

The court's reasonable suspicion determination was not

clearly erroneous.

Id.

-14-

POINT II
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS PROPER
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
As previously noted, defendant's arguments in points
II-III concerning the subsequent search of the Bronco and police
questioning, appear to be nothing more than an extenuation of his
argument in point I, without sufficient factual development (Br.
of App. at 10-11).

Defendant appears to assert that the officers

lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant
and his companion were engaged in illegal activity prior to
stopping the Bronco; therefore, the subsequent vehicle search, as
well as police questioning, were allegedly invalid and any
contraband seized, or information gained therefrom, should be
suppressed pursuant to Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963).

As before, defendant's broad and unsubstantiated

allegations are without merit.
The trial court found that there was probable cause for
the search of defendant's Bronco.

Specifically, the Court

stated:
The Court believes the search of the
defendants' vehicle was proper. The list of
items purchased from Intertech received while
the officers were in pursuit, combined with
the suspicious behavior of the defendants,
and all attendant circumstances, created
probable cause for [sic] search of the
vehicle.
(R. at 111, para. # 7 ) . Although the trial court determined that
the search of defendant's vehicle was supported by probable
cause, the court's ruling does not expressly state which
-15-

exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment it
was applying.

Admittedly, a search and seizure conducted without

a warrant is unreasonable per se unless it falls within a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement.

State v.

Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation
omitted); Menke, 787 P.2d at 543. However, the search of
defendant's vehicle was justified under the automobile exception
to the warrant requirement first articulated in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 151-52 (1925).

The Carroll Court

determined that a warrantless search of an automobile was
permissable if the searching officers "have probable cause to
believe that the automobile contains either contraband or
evidence of a crime and that they may be lost if not immediately
seized."

State v. Droneburq, 781 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah Ct. App.

1989) (quoting State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah
1984))-

See Chambers v. Maronev, 399 U.S. 42 (1975).

See also

California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798 (1982); State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1087-88
(Utah 1986).6

Thus, where as here, a vehicle is lawfully

stopped based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and
6

Because defendant has neither raised nor requested a
separate state constitutional analysis under article I, section
14 of the Utah Constitution, the State's argument is based solely
on the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and
thus; does not address the plurality opinion in State v. Larocco,
794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) which held that under article I, section
14 of the Utah Constitution, warrantless searches are permissible
"only where they satisfy their traditional justification, namely,
to protect the safety of police or the public or to prevent the
destruction of evidence." Id. at 469-70.
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officers observe contraband which may be lost if not immediately
seized, the Carroll doctrine would justify an immediate and
warrantless search.
1978).

State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah

See Christensen, 676 P.2d at 411.

See also State v.

Hvcrh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985).
Reviewing all the information available to the officers
in light of the circumstances as they existed at the time of the
search, the evidence shows that the officers had ample
information available to establish probable cause that there was
contraband in the vehicle and to justify an immediate warrantless
search of the Bronco.
Officers Caldwell and Fox testified that they observed
drug paraphernalia and chemicals in plain view in the back of
defendant's Bronco at the time of the stop (T. at 19, 69).
Specifically, Officer Fox testified that he observed gallon
containers and glass flasks of chemical in an open box in the
back of the Bronco (T. at 19). Officer Caldwell testified that
he observed glassware, heating panels and units, stirring rods,
color blast testing strips and rubber gloves (T. at 69).

These

observations, together with the suspicious behavior of defendant
and his companion at the time they purchased the glassware and
chemicals, the information from Intertech concerning the
purchased items, as well as defendant's evasive and reckless
driving prior to the stop, all support the trial court's apparent
determination that there was probable cause to associate the drug
paraphernalia and chemicals observed in the Bronco with the
-17-

suspected illegal manufacture of methamphetamine.

See Menke, 7 87

P.2d at 544 (contraband seized was the anticipated fruit of the
suspected theft).

Thus, in summary, defendant was lawfully

stopped and investigated, probable cause existed for the search
of the Bronco, and the warrantless search was justified under the
automobile exception.

Therefore, the trial court did not err in

denying defendant's motion to suppress and this Court should
affirm the lower court's ruling on this ground.

See State v.

Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986) (Court may affirm trial
court's decision to admit evidence on any proper ground).
As for defendant's allegation in point III, he vaguely
asserts that information obtained through police questioning was
tainted and therefore "inadmissable" because it followed the
alleged illegal stop of defendant's Bronco (Br. of App. at 11).
Significantly, defendant does not attack the trial court's
findings in regard to the propriety of police questioning
following his arrest.

The trial court specifically held that

[t]he officers on the scene [] arrested the
defendants and gave the appropriate Miranda
warnings. Defendants were interviewed
separately concerning what they had purchased
and the purpose for which they had purchased
it. They gave the officers different
stories—but both indicated that they were
purchasing the equipment for someone else.
. . .

Defendants were properly given their
Miranda warnings. Even before the officers
began investigatory questioning which does
not require it, defendants were given Miranda
warnings.
(R. at 109, 111, supra pp. 5-7 para. ## 3, 6).
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As previously noted in point I, it is the State's
position that the stop of defendant's Bronco was valid pursuant
to the officers' reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; thus,
subsequent events were not tainted thereby.

Because defendant

has not presented additional argument, legal analysis, authority
or record support for his allegations, the State will not further
address defendant's argument on this point. Moreover,
defendant's minimal and conclusory analysis does not merit review
by this Court.

State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah

1984); State v. Stercrer, 808 P.2d 122, 125 n.2 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (court declined to rule on defendant's arguments due in
part to his failure to provide any meaningful analysis).
POINT III
THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S
RESIDENCE.
In point IV of his brief defendant appears to assert
that Officer Caldwell's affidavit in support of a search warrant
for defendant's residence was insufficient to establish probable
cause (Br. of App. at 11-12).

Specifically, defendant asserts

that w[n]othing contained in either the affidavit or in the
transcript of the hearing reveals any claim to a source, whether
confidential or otherwise, which claims to have seen any
contraband or other evidence of criminal conduct" (Br. of App. at
13).

Defendant's meritless allegations are unsupported by the

record.
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It is well established that a finding of "probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation" is required for the
issuance of a search warrant.

State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 285

(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted).

It is equally clear

that whether an affidavit in support of a search warrant
established probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant
is determined by the totality of the circumstances.

State v.

Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d
1258 (Utah 1983) (adopting Gates analysis)), cert, denied, 773
P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).

In determining whether the issuing

magistrate reached a practical, common sense decision that there
is "probable cause to believe that evidence is located in a
particular place," the reviewing court does not conduct a "de
novo probable-cause determination;" rather, the reviewing court
determines whether the evidence viewed as a whole" provides a
"'substantial basis' for the finding of probable cause."

JA. at

1109-10 (citing Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732-733
(1984)); Brown, 798 P.2d at 286 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230,
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987), and State v.
Droneburg, 781 P-2d 1303, 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).

In so

determining, the reviewing court should pay "great deference to
the magistrate's decision."
(Utah 1989).

State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991

A review of Officer Caldwell's affidavit

accordingly reveals a "substantial basis" for the magistrate's
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determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant for defendant's residence.
As previously noted, defendant's primary challenge to
the affidavit appears to be that it failed to identify a "source"
for the information contained therein (Br. of App. at 13).
However, contrary to defendant's assertion, the "source" of
Officer Caldwell's information was clearly stated in the
affidavit (R. at 70-72, see Addendum A).

Specifically, Officer

Caldwell relied upon his own and Officer Fox's investigation and
observations of defendant's conduct (R. at 70-72, see Addendum
A). 7

As set forth in the affidavit, Officer Fox observed

defendant and his companion load drug paraphernalia into their
vehicle at Intertech (R. at 72, see Addendum A ) .

He then relayed

that information to Officer Caldwell in a request for backup
assistance, who then contacted Intertech to find out what
defendant had purchased (R. at 71-72, see Addendum A).

Based on

the information he received from Intertech, as well as
defendant's reckless and evasive driving, Officer Caldwell
determined that defendants had purchased prohibited drug
paraphernalia with the intent to manufacture the controlled
substances (R. at 71, see Addendum A ) .
7

Because a police officer is generally presumed to be
reliable, no special showing of either Officer Caldwell's or
Officer Fox's reliability is required here. 3 W. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 3.5(a), p. 3 (1987) (citing United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965)). Cf. State v. Miller, 740 P.2d
1363, 1366 (Utah Ct. App.) (average neighbor witness is not the
type of informant in need of independent proof of reliability or
veracity) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah
1987).
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As further stated in his affidavit, Officer Caldwell
subsequently interviewed both defendant and his companion and
received conflicting stories concerning an individual who
allegedly asked them to purchase the paraphernalia on his behalf
(R. at 70-71, see Addendum A).

Officer Caldwell also ran a

criminal history on codefendant Garza and learned that she had
previously been arrested for conspiracy to manufacture
methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute and possess
methamphetamine•

See State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah

Ct. App.) (probable cause determination supported by information
that defendant had previously been convicted of a similar
offense), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).

Based on the

foregoing information, Officer Caldwell determined that defendant
and his companion were "not being honest" with him and that,
contrary to their assertions, they were in fact themselves
manufacturing and distributing methamphetamine in their residence
and that a search of that residence would reveal additional
paraphernalia (R. at 70, see Addendum A).

Thus, contrary to

defendant's assertion, Officer Caldwell's affidavit provided a
substantial basis for the magistrate's determination of probable
cause to believe that contraband would be discovered inside
defendant's residence.

Therefore, this Court should affirm the

trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress on this
ground.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial
court denying defendant's motion to suppress should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /[r

day of July, 1991.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General /

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

CIRCUIT COT,!Vr, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMr'lT
DTAH COU1JTY, STATE OF DTAH
******************** *****************************************

PROBAELE CAUSE
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF AND MOTION FOR A
SEARCH WARRANT

STATE OF UTAH,
-VSOCCUPANTS OF

So^h
1291 E a s t
Mu:
56QLQ

CASE NO.

A************************************************************

STATE OF UTAH,

)

COUNTY OF UTAH

)

1. Gary Caldwell
oath/ deposes and says;
2.
3.

f

being first duly sworn on

That I am a police officer for American Fork Police
Department, American Fork, Utah, Utah County, State
of Ut;h.
That I have been a police officer for the past cen years.
I have been working with a narcotics task force as a
supervisor for the past two years. I have experience in
serving as many as 100 search warrants during the past eight
years. I have arrested many people for narcotics violations
during the same period of time

4.

I have been to narcotics training classes during the past
two years to train me in working with different types of
narcotics cases. One of the classes dealt with methamphetimines
and how people operate labs. I have been trained in all
aspects of the operation of and the way people operate in
order to set a lab up.

5.

In the past three months I have had experience in arresting
as many as twelve persons who have been involved in manufacturing
methamphetimine labs. I have found and located meth labs
in houses and vehicles. I have seen the equipment used and
the method of operation.

6.

On July 20th, 1989 at 1400 hours, Lt. Fox of the American
Fork Police Department observed a blue 1980 Bronco with Utah
Plates # 023 DAD pick up items from Intertech Trading in
Orem, Utah at 170 South Mtn. Way Dr. The itmes he could see
being loaded appeared to be paraphrenlia items used in a
methamphetimine lab. Lt. Fox contacted your affiant at the
American Fork Police Dept. and told me what he had seen. He
was asked to follow the vehicle until I could determine who
the person picking the itmes up was.

I was able to determine that the items picked up were items
listed on the House Bill # 3 as paraphrenlia items. I believe
that based on the actions of the two suspects in the vehicle
and the items purchased by cash from Intertech Trading that
the two persons knew that the items were going or were probably
going to a meth lab.
The actions were that the two suspects hid the itmes in the
rear of the vehicle they were driving. They did not gine any
names at the time of purchase. They picked up items listed
on House Bill #3 and other items we believe are used to manu
facture meth. They had some one other than the registered
owner drive the vehicle.
At approximately 1400 hours, your affiant stopped the suspect
vehicle and advised the driver of his rights. He told your affiar
that he was paid to come to Orem by a man he knows as "Fatso"
and pick up the paraphrenlia items. He told me that he
was to take the items to Salt Lake Cith to a motel, rent a
room and call the guy at a pay phone booth and he would come
pick up the chemicals and glass ware, he told me that he was
given $540.00 cash to pay for the items.
Your affiant interviewed the female suspect at the American
Fork Police Department and she told your affiant that she
met a man in a business in Salt Lake City two months ago.
She told me that the man she knows as Mike Shriver is
from California and he gave-her $2,000.00 in cash to go to
Orem to pick the chemicals and paraphrenlia items up. She
said they were to take the items to Salt Lake to a Motel
and rent it for three days and put the key on top of the
pay phone outside.The suspect was to call her at her house
and she would tell him where the key was and he would pick
the items up.
Your affiant believes that there is probable cause to believe
that both suspects were in possession of drug paraphrenlia
with intent to manufacture Methamphetamines. Your affiant
ran a criminal history on April Garza and found that
she has been in prison in California and possible Oregon. I
found that.she had family in Oregon. I learned that she has
been arrested for Conspiracy to Manufacture Methamphetamines
Conspracy to Dist. and Poss Methamphetamines . She also
has a arrest for assault on a police officer with a firearm.
Your affiant interviewed April and Leonard, the two suspects
and both of them gave your affiant an address in Salt Lake
City. April gave your affiant this address also and said she
lived here too. I asked her which address she really lived at
and she gave me the 5600 South 1291 East #6. I was able to
have her give me her phone number. She stated the number was
the number registered to the stated address. I called Mary
at Mtn. Bell and she told me that the phone number given to
your affiant was registered to April at 5600 South 1291 East
#6 in Murray,Utah

7

13.

Your affiant sent Det. Blackhurst and Det. Taylor from Orem
Police to Murray: to the stated address, and they located
a 280 Z car which is registered to April. The car is parked
right in front of the stated residence. Your affiant was
told by Blackhurst that the mail box in front ofthe residence
had the name of April and Leonard on it.

14.

Your affiant believes that the two listed suspects have not
been honest with me and that they in fact may the ones
making or manufacturing or distributing methamphetannines. That
they in fact live at the stated address at 5600 South 1291 East
#6.

15.

Your affiant believes that the two suspects are or may be
in possession of controlled substances in the residence which
have been manufactured by glass ware and items the same as
we seized. Your affiant believes that the two suspects will
be in possession of items used to distribute or manufacture
controlled substances, and that they will be in possession
of items used to identify them and their sources for the
sale or distribution of controlled substances.

16.

Your affiant believes that because of the evidence found
already and the criminal history of April and because of
the type of items involved in the use and manufacturing of
methamphetimines that there is a serious danger to the officers
serving the search warrant. April is not in the house, but
in the Utah County Jail, however, anyone could be in the stated
residence.

17.

Therefore, Your affiant respectfully request a warrant to
search the stated residence and to enter the residence without
first giving notice of our'presence and intent to enter.

„i/^y
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 2gP
TIME; IS.^I

DAY OF JULY 1989.

CIRCUIT ^ U R T JUDGE

~~

